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During and In Relation To: How the Ninth Circuit
Rewrote a Statute in the Case of the Millennium Bomber
By Peter A. Talevicht
"Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spo-
ken laws, it is he who is truly the law-giver to all intents and pur-
poses, and not the person who first wrote or spoke them."
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts are often faced with difficult issues of statutory construction,
forced to discern sometimes confusing and conflicting legislation that
may sweep more broadly or cut more narrowly than what Congress in-
tended or what the Constitution will tolerate. I n  interpreting such stat-
utes, the Supreme Court has long spoken of restraint in establishing the
proper judicial role by deferring to legislative policy choices.
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1. WILLIAM P. STATSKY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS AND DRAFTING I I  (John F. O'Connell &
Bruce Condy French eds., West Publ'g Co. 2d. ed. 1984) (1975) (quoting Bishop Benjamin Hoad-
ley).
2. See, e.g., Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) (Douglas, J.)
r [W ]e do not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to determine whether
the policy which i t expresses offends the public welfare."); Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U.S. 20, 27
(1933) (Cardozo, J.) ("We do not pause to consider whether a statute differently conceived and
framed would yield results more consonant with fairness and reason. W e take the statute as we find
it") ; Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 250-51 (1926) (Brandeis, J.) ("What the [party] •  • asks
is not a construction of a statute, but, in effect, an enlargement of it by the court, so that what was
omitted, presumably by inadvertence, may be included within its scope.").
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when a statute is plain on its face and is intended to address the very
conduct at issue, a court is not free to read more into the statute to ad-
dress its own notions of fairness? In United States v. Ressam,
4 h o w e v e r ,the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ran afoul of this principle—providing
an example of the judiciary overstepping its role in statutory construction
by inferring an unwritten element into an explosives statute. Not surpris-
ingly, the United States Supreme Court announced that it had reversed
the Ninth Circuit by an 8-1 margin on May 19, 2008.
5 The 2007 appeal before the Ninth Circuit, which followed the con-
viction of so-called Millennium Bomber, Ahmed Ressatn, was expected
to center around the government's contention that the twenty-two year
sentence handed down was unreasonably low.
6 R e s s a m ,  
h o w e v e r ,  
c r o s s -
appeal d and argued that his conviction for canying an explosive' during
t e commission of a felony (lying to customs officials) required the gov-
ernment to prove not only a temporal link between the carrying of the
explosive and the underlying felony, but also a "relational element' be-
tween the two.
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find that Ressam carried the explosive " in relation top" giving fats
statements to the customs official. The jury was not instructed to find
this element at trial. Because two other circuits had already rejected the
argument that the explosives statute required a relational elernent,
10 R e s -sam's claim appeared to have little chance of success.
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3. See. e.g., Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, R e h n q u i s t ,  )  ("When we find the
semis of the statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is co x c e p t  in -
r a r e  a n d  e x c e p t i o t t n i  
c i r -
curnstances,'"); Tenn ssee \Talley Antli v. Hill, 437 ce,S  3  8 o  n.24 (1978) ("Vilhen contronted
with a statute which is plain and unambiguous on its fa..c, we orom t Ia rio ret ook to legislative
history as a guide to its meaning,"); United States v, Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 278 U.S. 269, 278
(1929)(1V/here the language of tin enactment is clear, and construction according to its terms does
not lead to absurd or impracticable consequences, the words em '  fi n a l
expression of the Meaning intended.").
4. United States v. Ressam (Ressam 1), 474 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2007), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 1858
2008).
5. United States v. Ressam (Ressani DTI, 128 S. Ct. 1858, 1862 (2008).
6. For example, the Seattle Times article following the oral arguments focused extensively on
"ie reasonableness of  the sentence and only mentioned Ressam's cross appeal in two-sentence
parawaph at the end of the article. M ike Carter, Justice Depcirtinent Argues ,for 7 gee Sentence
for  Ressam, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov, 14, 2006, at Bl . W ith the issue of the explosive
the courts Wili now finally address the sentencing issue in future mlings. For  a brief discu
the disposition of the Ressam sentencing issue at the time of this Note's publication, see infra Part V.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 8440)(2)(2006).
8. Ressarn 1, 474 F
.
:3d a t  
5 9 8 - 9 9
.
9. See infra Part
10. The Third and Fifth Circuits had published opinions sta
statute criminalizing "carrying an explosive during the commission cif a felony," did not " t  tuiL a
relational clement. United States v. Rosenberg, 806 F.2d 1169 (3d Cir. 1986); United States. v. Ivy,
929 F,2d 147 (5th Cir. 1991), Although riot considered by the Ninth Circuit or Pt e Supreme Court,
the Sixth and Eighth Circuits had also rejected a relational element in unpublished opinions. United
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But early in the government's oral argument, the judges on the
Ninth Circuit panel made clear that the explosives statute, and not the
sentencing issue, was their first priority. One of the panel judges asked
the government's attorney to address the explosives issue rather than sen-
tencing. Referring to a prior case that had held that the federal firearms
statute contained an implicit relational element," she stated, "I don't un-
derstand how we are free in this circuit to say [that the statute does not
contain a relational element]."
12 I n d e e d ,  
w h e n  
t h e  
d e c i s i o
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nounced in January 2007, the court had not only reserved the sentencing
issue for another day but went further by reversing Ressam's conviction
on the explosives charge.
° In reversing part of Ressam's conviction, the Ninth Circuit's me-
thod of analyzing the explosives statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2), erred at
three key points. First, the court failed to conduct a satisfactory plain-
language analysis of the statute.
° T h i s  
a n a l y s i s  
w o u l d  
h a v e  
c o n c l u
d e d
that the phrase "carries an explosive during the commission of a felony"
has a plain meaning that includes no requirement that the explosive fa-
cilitate the felony.
° 
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and legislative history is unnecessary when a statute is plain on its fac e
the statute's history only further confirms its lack o f  a relational ele-
ment." Although Congress added an explicit relational element to the
crime of carrying a firearm during a felony,
18 i t  d i d  n o t  
a d d  t h e  
s a m e
element to the explosives sta ute.
° T h i s  w a s  
a  
p o l i c y  
c h o i c e  
m a d e  
i n
recognition of  the different dang rs presented by explosives and fire-
States v. Jenkins, No. 03-5055, 2005 WL 3440416 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. King, No. 99-
3449, 2000 WL 1277815 (8th Cir. 2000).
11. United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538 (9th Cir. 1985).
12. Media access: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Oral Arguments, Unit-
ed States v. Ressam, 474 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-30422) (audio on file with author) [here-
inafter Ressam Oral Arguments Before the Ninth Circuit]. T he Ninth Circuit Court of  Appeals
makes available audio files of its oral arguments, but does not publish transcripts.
13. Ressam 1 ,
4 7 4  F .
3 d  
a t  
5 9 9
.
14. In recognizing that most members of Congress vote based on the language of the statute, a
plain-language analysis is preferred whenever possible. Lamle v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 538
(2004). Aft r  finding that the statute contained a plain meaning, the Ninth Circuit panel's analysis
should have ended. See United States v. Trident Seafoods Corp., 92 F.3d 855, 862 (9th Cir. 2000)
( " If the statutory language is clear, we need look no further than that language in determining the
meaning of the statute.").
15. But see United States v. Ressam (Ressam /11), 128 S. Ct. 1858, 1863 (2008) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
16. Trident, 92 F.3d at 862; see also Ressam III, 128 S. Ct. at 1862 (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) ("Because the plain language of the statute squarely answers the
question presented in this case, tjoin only Part 1 of the Court's opinion.").
17. See discussion infra Part 111.A.3.
18. United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538, 539 (9th Cir. 1985).
19. 18 U.S.C.* 844(h)(2) (2006).
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arms, not an inadvertent omission." Third, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly
relied on United States v. Stewart,
21 a  c a s e  
t h a t  h a d  
r e a d  
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r e l a t i o n
a l  
e l e -
ment into the firearms statute.
22 T h i s  
e l i a n c e  
w a s  
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e d  
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Stewart's method of inquiry had been undermined by rules of statutory
construction arti ulated by the Supreme Court.
23 The existence or nonexistence of a relational element has a signifi-
cant effect on the scope of the explosives statute.
24 R e a d  w i t h o u t  
a  r e l a -
tional el ment, the statute could have the effect of harshly criminalizing
conduct where the xplosives were incidentally present and unrelated to
the underlying felony,
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2 6
Conversely, the presence of a relational element would have the effect of
decriminalizing conduct in which the explosive presented a significant
and indiscriminate d a n g e r
2 7
— f a l l i n g  
d i r e c t l y  
w i t h i n  
t h e  
c l a s
s  
o f  
h a r
m
addressed by the statute—but did not actually further the underlying fel-
ony. These two conflicting goals of the statute only further indicate that
the judgment of a statute's breadth and harshness are inherently policy-
related and must be resolved by Congress rather than the courts.
This Note analyzes the facts of the Ressam case and the legal analy-
sis applied to it by both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court. Part II
discusses the intriguing history of the Ressam case.
28 P a r t  I I I  
e x a m i n e s
the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Ressam and shows why the Supreme
Court was correct in reversing the improperly decided case. Part IV dis-
cusses the possible scope of the explosives statute under each interpreta-
tion—without or with a relational element. Finally, Part V concludes by
commenting on the future of  the explosives statute in light of the Su-
preme Court's decision, as well as the future of Ahmed Ressam.
20. See discussion infra Part
21. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538.
22. Id at 539-40.
23. See Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004).
24. See discussion infra Part IV.
25. See Ressam Oral Arguments Before the Ninth Circuit, supra note 12; see also discussion
infra Part W A.
26. See United States v. Ressam (Ressam III), 128 S. Ct. 1858, 1863 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
27. See United States v. Ressam (Ressam II), 491 F.3d 997, 999 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007) (denial of
rehearing en banc) (O'Scalmlain, J., dissenting).
28. See United States v. Ressam (Ressam IV), 538 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2008) (remanding to
U.S. District Court for  resentencing in accordance with current Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court
precedent).
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H. THE HIGH PROFILE CAPTURE, TRIAL, AND
SENTENCING OF ARMED RESSAM
Ahmed Ressam waits in the Federal Maximum Security Prison at
Florence, Colorado
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years after his capture. This  Part discusses Ressam's plot to attack the
United States, which ended with his arrest at the United States-Canada
border, his conviction on nine federal charges, and his ultimate hope of
avoiding a lengthy prison sentence through a sympathetic judge and an
unprecedented statutory interpretation.
A. Ahmed Ressam's Plot Against America
In February 1994, Ressam, an Algerian, entered North America for
the first time—and was immediately detained at Mirabel Airport in Mon-
treal, where he admitted to using a false passport to enter Canada."
Seemingly headed for deportation, Ressam attempted to gain political
asylum by claiming he had been tortured by Algerian police'
l b u t  m i s s e dhis immigration court date and remained in the country.
32 L a t e r ,  R e s s a mwas caught shoplifting from a department store and ordered to leave the
country, but the departure date came and went and  he stayed.
33 By mid-1995, Ressam was moving beyond petty theft and immigra-
tion violations to more dangerous activities.
34 H e  b e g a n  
t o  
a s s o c i a t e  
w i t h
Fateh Kamel, a former mujahld
35 i n  
A f g h a n i s t a n  
a n d  
B o s n i a .
3 6  
R e s s
a m
29. The inmate list of ADX Florence, as it is known, is a veritable "who's who" of terrorists
involved in attacks against American interests. In addition to Ressam, the prison houses Unabomber
Ted Kaczynski; Oklahoma City Federal Building accomplice Terry Nichols; the mastermind of the
first attack on the World Trade Center, Ramzi \rouse
.
; a l - c l a e d a  s h o e  
b o m b e r  
R i c h a r d  
R e i d ;  
a n d
September 11 conspirator Zacharias Moussaui. Marianne \Toilers, Inside Bomber Row, TIME, Nov.
5, 2006, at  36-40, available at  http://www.time.comitimeimagazinefarticle/0,9171,1555145,00.
html.
30. Hal Bemton et al., The Terrorist Within: The Story of One Man's Holy War Against Amer-
ica, Chapter 4: Sneaking In, SEATTLE TIMES, June 24, 2002, at A5. This Part draws extensively
from The Terrorist Within, the series in The Seattle Times on Ressam's capture, written by Hal
Bemton, Mike Carter, David Heath, and James Neff. The entire series, including a Dossier with
several pr im ar y sources, i s  avai lable a t  http://seattletimes.nwsource.cominewsination-
worlditerroristwithini.
31. Id. Ironically, Ressam claimed that he suffered prejudice after he was accused of being an
Islamic terrorist. Ahmed Ressam's Request for Political Asylum, in Hal Bemton et al., The Terror-
ist Within: The Story of One Man's Holy War Against America, Chapter 4: Sneaking In (Dossier),
SEATTLE TIMES, June 24, 2002, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.cominewsinationworldi
terroristwithinidossieriimmigrationialse.pdf.
32. Bemton et al., supra note 29.
33. Hal Bemton et al., The Terrorist Within: The Story of One Man's Holy War Against Amer-
ica, Chapter 6: It Takes a Thief SEATTLE TIMES, June 26, 2002, at A8.
34. Id
35. A mujahid is a person who strives or fights in support of Islam.
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joined a radical mosque and surrounded himself with fellow disaffected
immigrants.
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Ressam and his fellow sympathizers, they generally viewed the group as
"more pathetic than dangerous."
38 Far from being pathetic, by March 1998, Ressam planned to travel
to Afghanistan to train at a terrorist camp, but he first needed the Cana-
dian passport that would allow him to travel with ease.
39 R e s s a m  h a dlittle difficulty obtaining t is identification: he stole a blank baptismal
certificate from a Catholic parish and forged the priest's signature.
°Then, he paid an acquaintance to pick up his passport.
41 H i s  n e w  n a m e :Benni Antoine Noris.
42 Under his new name, Ressam traveled to Pakistan and met with top
al Qaeda leader Abu Zubaydah.
43 H e  t h e n  
a t t e n d e d  
a  
t e r r o r i s
t  
t r a i n i
n g
camp in Khalden, Afgha istan, for six months.
44 R e c r u i t s  a t  
t h e s e  
c a m p s
learned about combat and terrorist techniques and heard lectures from
veterans o f  groups such as Hamas, Hizbollah, and Islamic J ihad.
°Around this time, Abu Doha, the ringleader of Ressam's Algerian train-
ing g oup, visited Osama bin Laden in Kandahar and told him that a cell
was ready to wage jihad in the United States.
° R e s s a m ,  
m e a n w h i l e ,  
f o l -36. Id. Kamel served a prison sentence in France. He reportedly returned to Canada and pre-sumably remains there at the time of  this Note's publication. Mark Hosenball, Once a Terrorist,
Always a Terrorist? A Top Canadian Intelligence Official Says There's Little Hope of Rehabilitating
Suspected Islamist Terrorists, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 18, 2006, http://www.newsweek.com/id/47316.
37. Hal Bernton et al., The Terrorist Within: The Story of One Man's Holy War Against Amer-
ica, Chapter 7: Joining Jihad, SEATTLE TIMES, June 27, 2002, at A8.
38. Id.
39. Hal Hermon et al., The Terrorist Within: The Story of One Man's Holy War Against Amer-
ica, Chapter 8: Going to Camp, SEATTLE TIMES, June 28, 2002, at Al2.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. United States v. Ressam (Ressam I), 474 F.3d 597, 599 (9th Cir. 2007), rev'd, 128 S. Ct.
1858 (2008).
43. Bemton et. al., supra note 39. Zubayda was something of a mentor and evaluator of poten-
tial Islamic warriors. I d  He was wounded and apprehended in Pakistan on March 28, 2002, making
him, at the time, the highest-ranking al Qaeda operative to be captured after September Il th. John
F. Burns, In Pakistan's Interior, A Troubling Victory In Hunt for al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14,
2002, at 20, available at 2002 WLNR 4432828. H e is currently being held at Guantanamo Bay.
William Glaberson, Detainee Denies Involvement in Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2007, at Al2.
Ressam described Zubaydah's role in the following way: "He is the person in charge of the camps.
He receives young men from all countries. He accepts you or rejects you. And he takes care of the
expenses for the camps. H e makes arrangements for you when you travel coming in or leaving."
Bin Laden Deputy Profiled: Suspected Top al Qaeda Leader is in U.S. Custody, CBS NEWS, Apr. 3,
2002, http://www.cbsnews.comistories/2002/03/30/terror/main505014.shtml (last visited Nov. 10,
2008).
44. Ressam I, 474 F.3d at 599.
45. Bemton et al., supra note 39.
46. Id
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lowed up his initial training at a more specialized camp akin to "terrorist
graduate school," focusing on explosives.
47 Having effectively received an advanced degree in terrorism, Res-
sam traveled back through Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) in
February 1999, where he envisioned the devastation an attack would
have on the busy airport." Although he briefly considered detonating a
vehicle bomb in a Jewish neighborhood in Montrea1,
49 R e s s a m  f o c u s e don attacking LAX.
51) To carry out his attack, Ressam and an associate first checked into a
motel in Vancouver, British Columbia on November 17, 1999, where
they would manufacture the necessary explosives.
51 D u r i n g  t h i s  
t i m e ,
Ressam became very ill, having contracted malaria while he was training
in the Middle East.
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Ressam set out alone for Seattle on December 14, 1999:
3 Erroneously believing his entry into the United States with explo-
sives would be easier by boat, Ressam took an extended route to Seattle,
where he was to meet another associate to transport the bomb to Los An-
geles.
54 
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then boarded the M.V. Coho to Washington State's Olympic Peninsula:
5This unusual route to Seattle aroused the suspicion of an agent on the
Canadian side of the ferry route, who searched Ressam's trunk but still
allowed him to board.
56 R e s s a m  
d i s e m b a
r k e d  
i n  
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ton, at approxim tely 6:00 p.m•
57 At this time, the customs officials' shifts at the dock were ending,
and Ressam's green Chrysler was the last vehicle to drive off the ferry.
58He again raised suspicion with his fidgeting, rummaging around the con-
sole of his vehicle, and sweating (due in part to his illness and in part to
his nervousness).
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out a cus oms declaration, which he signed under his false name of Benni
47. M
48. M
49. Hal Bemton et al., The Terrorist Within: The Story of One Man
ica, Chapter 10: The Mission, SEATTLE TIMES, June 30, 2002, at A10.
50. M
51. Hal Bemton et al., The Terrorist Within: The Story of One Man
ica, Chapter 11: The Ticking Bomb, SEATTLE TIMES, July 1, 2002, at A6.
52. M
53. id.
54. Id
55. Hal Bemton et al., The Terrorist Within: The Story of One Man
ica, Chapter 12: The Crossing, SEATTLE TIMES, July 2, 2002, at AU.
56. Id.
57. M
58. Id.
59. Id.
's Holy War Against Amer-
's Holy War Against Amer-
's Holy War Against Amer-
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Noris .
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spare tire compartment and found Ressam's explosives and bomb com-
pon nts, which the agents initially believed were dmgs.
61 A l t h o u g h  R e s -sam attempted to flee on foot, he was quickly arrested, jailed, and
charged in federal court in Seattle.
62 Ressam's arrest set off fears of a larger plot to attack the United
States at the turn of the millennium, nearly two years before the events of
September 11, 2001.
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tion was cancelled amid worry and considerable publicity.
64
B. Trial, Cooperation, and Sentencing
Based on extensive pretrial publicity, the federal district court
moved the trial from Seattle to Los Angeles.
65 I r o n i c a l l y ,  
t h i s  
c h a n g e  
i n
venue to the location of Ressam's target was made before the revelation
that e intended to attack LAX.
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counts on April 6, 2001.
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60. United States v. Ressam (Ressam I), 474 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 2007), rev'd, 128 S. Ct.
1858 (2008). There has been some disagreement within the counterterrorism community on whether
customs officials had been alerted to the threat of terrorism prior to Ressam's apprehension. Former
White House counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke stated in his book Against All Enemies that an
international alert for terrorist activity played a role in Ressam's capture. Mike Carter, Clarke Book
Has Errors About Arrest o f
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National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, as well as a customs official who apprehended Res-
sam, stated that customs was on no such special alert and credited Dean's careful observation of
Ressam with the capture. Id.
61. Bemton et al., supra note 55.
62. Id.
63. Hal Bemton et al., The Terrorist Within: The Story of One Man's Holy War Against Amer-
ica, Chapter 14: The Warning, SEATTLE TIMES, July 4, 2002, at A6.
64. Steve Miletic et al., How City Party Was Cancelled; Police Official Made Case For Clos-
ing Center, SENITLE TIMES, Dec. 28, 1999, at Al .
65. Defendant's Motion for  a Change of  Venue, United States v. Ressam, No. CR99-666C
(W.D. Wash. Feb. 4, 2000). In bringing the motion, Ressam's attorneys argued that "local coverage
of Mr. Ressam has been pervasive and ongoing. The publicity is sometimes inaccurate, frequently
speculative, and almost always prejudicial. Moreover, fear fanned by the publicity surrounding Mr.
Ressam's prosecution has triggered events locally that heighten the improbability of obtaining a fair
and impartial trial in this district." Id.; see also United States v. Ressam (Ressam /), 474 F.3d 597,
601 (9th Cir. 2007), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 1858 (2008).
66. Mike Carter & Steve Miletich, Ressam Confirms Millennium Plot: L.A. Airport Was Tar-
get, SEATTLE TIMES, May 30, 2001, at Al . Officials suggested that LAX was a target when they
found a map with the airport circled in Ressam's Montreal apartment. Ressam confirmed this to
prosecutors after his conviction. Id.
67. The nine counts against Ressam were (1) An act of terrorism transcending a national boun-
dary, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2332b(a)(1)(B) and 2332b(c); (2) placing an explosive in proximity to a terminal,
18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 33; (3) possessing false identification documents to defraud the United States, 18
U.S.C. § 1028(a)(4) and (b)(3)(B); (4) use of a fictitious name for admission to the United States, 18
U.S.C. § 1546; (5) making a false statement to U.S. Customs Inspectors, 18 U.S.C. § 1001; (6)
muggling explosives, 18 U.S.C. §§ 545 and 2; (7) unlicensed transportation of  explosives, 18
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an explosive while committing the crime of making false statements to a
customs official, would ultimately take center stage in the federal court
of appeals.
68 With these nine convictions giving rise to a possible 130-year sen-
tence,
69 
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a deal from the federal government to testify against co-conspirators and
to t ll federal agents everything he knew about al Qaeda.
71 I n  l i g h t  o fRessam's cooperation, U.S. District Judge John Coughenour delayed his
sentencing until 2005.
72 R e s s a m  
c o o p e r a
t e d  
f o r  
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l y  
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which h  provided helpful information about international terrorism.
72He stopped cooper ting in early 2003,
74 a n d  h i s  
r e f u s a l  
t o  
t e s t i f y  
a g a i n s t
two terrorists led to the dismissal of federal charges against them.
75 R e s -sam returned to district court to be sentenced on July 27, 2005.
76 Judge Coughenour sentenced Ressam to twenty-two years in pris-
on.77 The government sought a thirty-five year sentence, arguing that by
no longer speaking to investigators, Ressam had chosen terrorism over
cooperation.
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opportunity to "unleash a broadside attack against secret tribunals and
U.S.C. §§ 842(a)(3)(A), 844(a) and 2; (8) possession of an unregistered firearm, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841,
586I(d), and 5871; (9) carrying an explosive during the commission of  a federal felony, namely
Counts 3-5, 18 U.S.C. 844(h)(2) . Second Superseding Indictment, United States v. Ressam, No.
CR99-0666.1CC (W.D. Wash. Feb. 14, 2001), 2001 WL 36095432.
68. See Ressam 1 ,
4 7 4  F . 3 d  
5 9 7 .
69. Thomas J. Lueck, Algerian Is Found Guilty in Plot to Bomb Sites in the US., N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 7, 2001, at A9.
70. See Hal Bernton et al., The Terrorist Within: The Story of One Man's Holy War Against
America, Chapter 16: The Reckoning, SEATTLE TIMES, July 6, 2002, at A8.
71. Id
72. See Ressam 1 ,
4 7 4  F . 3 d  
a t  
6 0 1 .
73. M
74. Id
75. Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee's Principle and Response Brief at 31, United States v.
Ressam, 474 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2007) (Nos. 05-30422 and 05-30441), 2006 WL 3098688 [hereinaf-
ter Government's Opening Brief to the Ninth Circuit]. Charges were dropped against Abu Doha, an
al-Qaeda recruiter in London, and Samir Al t Mohamed, whom Ressam had previously alleged
planned to detonate a truck bomb in a Montreal Jewish neighborhood. Doha, also known as Rachid
Bouldialfa, remains in custody in England. Craig S. Smith, 6 Former Guantanamo Detainees on
Trial in Paris, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2006, at A8. Mohamed was held in Canadian prison for four
years and deported to Algeria in 2006. Canada Quietly Deports Algerian Terrorist Suspect, CBC
NEWS, J an.  1 3 ,  2006,  avai lable a t  http://www.cbc.caicanadaistory/2006/01/13/deported-
terrofist060113.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2008).
76. Ressam 1, 474 F.3d at 601.
77. See id. at 599.
78. Government's Opening Brief to the Ninth Circuit, supra note 75, at 47.
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other war on terrorism tactics that abandon 'the ideals that set our nation
apart'"
79
:
I would like to convey the message that our system works. We did
not need to use a secret military tribunal, or detain the defendant in-
definitely as an enemy combatant, or deny him the right to counsel,
or invoke any proceedings beyond those guaranteed by or contrary
to the United States Constitution.
Despite the fact that Mr. Ressam is not an American citizen and de-
spite the fact that he entered this country intent upon killing Ameri-
can citizens, he received an effective, vigorous defense, and the op-
portunity to have his guilt or innocence determined by a jury of 12
ordinary citizens.
Most importantly, all of this occurred in the sunlight of a public tri-
al. There were no secret proceedings, no indefinite detention, no
denial of counse1.
8°Although the government's attorney did not initially indicate dis-
pleasure over the length of the sentence, others in the Justice Department
complained about the leniency shown, as well as the comments at sen-
tencing made by Judge Coughenour.
8I T h e  
g o v e r n m e n t  
fi l e d  
n o t i c e  
o f
appeal on August 25, 2005.
82 C l a i m i n g  
s u r p r i s e  
a b o u t  
t h e  
a p p e
a l ,  
R e
s -
sam's attorneys co sidered raising their own appeal—a cross-appeal on
Count 9.
83
COUNT 9 AND THE JUDICIAL REWRITING OF A STATUTE
When deciding Ressam's cross-appeal on Count 9, the Ninth Cir-
cuit improperly held that the government must prove that the explosives
carried by Ressam needed to be carried "in relation to" the underlying
felony." This holding created a circuit split
85 t h a t  n e e d e d  
t o  b e  
r e s o l v e d
by the Supreme Court.
86 E v e n  
w o r s e ,  
i t  
e x c e e
d e d  
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79. See Hal Bemton & Sara Jean Green, Ressam Judge Decries U.S. Tactics, SEArnE TIMES,
July 28, 2005, at Al
80. See Government's Opening Brief to the Ninth Circuit, supra note 75, at 20-22.
81. See Mike Carter, Longer Term Sought for Ressam, SEM
-
M E T I M E S ,  A u g .  
2 7 ,  2 0 0 5 ,  
a t  B l .
82. Id.
83. M
84. United States v. Ressam (Ressam 1), 474 F.3d 597, 599 (9th Cir. 2007), rev 'd, 128 S. Ct.
1858 (2008).
85. See discussion infra Part 111.A.2.
86. United States v. Ressam (Ressam 111), 128 S. Ct. 1858 (2008).
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judiciary by failing to defer to the policy judgments of Congress." This
Part offers an analysis of several ways in which the court erred.
A. The Ninth Circuit's Decision and Its Surrounding Legal Framework
1. The Decision
Judge Pamela Rymer wrote for the 2-1 majority ,
88 w h i c h  h e l d  
t h a t
18 §  844(h)(2) "requires a relationship between the underlying
crime and the ct of carrying an explosive."
89 T h e  c o u r t  
r e l i e d  
p r i m a r i l y
on its prior decision in United States v. Stewart," which interpreted 18
§ 924(c), a federal firearm law, to have always contained the re-
quirement that a firearm be used "during and in relation to" the underly-
ing felony.
91 
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contained a relational element and because the explosives statute was
modeled after the firearms statute, the court reasoned that it was bound to
find a similar relational element in the explosives statute.
92 In his dissent, Judge Arthur Alarcon argued that the statute con-
tained a plain meaning, and it was not fitting for the court to determine
that the statute had more elements than those enumerated on its face.
93Furthermore, Judge Alarcon argued that the court was not bound by Ste-
wart because its holding had been undercut by the Supreme Court in La-
mie v. United States Trustee." According to Judge Alarcon, Lamle stood
for the proposition that "where the language is plain, [the court] cannot
read an absent word into the statute,"
95 a n d  t h u s ,  
t h e  
e x p l o s i v e s  
s t a t u t e
could not be read to include a relational element.
96 The majority o f  non-recused active judges in the Ninth Circuit
chose not to rehear the case.
97 J u d g e  
D i a r m u i d  
O ' S c a n n t
a i n ,  
j o i n
e d  
b
y
87. See Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 538 (2004); see also discussion infra Part 111.C.3.
88. Ressam 1 ,
4 7 4  F .
3 d  
a t  
5 9 8 -
6 0 4 .
89. Id
90. 779 F.2d 538, 539 (9th Cir. 1984).
91. At the time of the Stewart opinion, Congress had already amended the statute to include
this language; however, the defendant had committed the crime under the prior version of the statute,
which criminalized carrying a firearm "unlawfully during the commission of a crime." Id.
92. Ressam 1 ,
4 7 4  F .
3 d  
a t  
6 0 2
.
93. Id at 607 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
94. Id at 608 (citing Lamle v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 538 (2004)).
95.1d
96. This Note argues that the dissent's reasoning should have largely governed in the Ninth
Circuit's case. See discussion supra Part 111.C.3.
97. United States v. Ressam (Ressam II), 491 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 2007) (denial of rehearing en
bane).
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five other judges,
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9 9
effectively sending a flare to the Supreme Court signaling that the Ninth
Circuit panel had overstepped judicial boundaries and the case merited
review. According to Judge O'Scannlain's dissent, Stewart did not com-
pel the reading of a relational element into the explosives statute and the
Ninth Circuit's misplaced reliance on Stewart had created a split with
other jurisdictions.
m T h e  
o p i n i o n  
a l s o  
s u g g
e s t e d  
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were constrained by Stewart, the entire court could overrule the prior
case and avoid a split with other circuits on the same question.'
81
2. The Court's Split with Other Circuits
Ressam created a split between the Ninth Circuit and the Third and
Fifth Circuits, which had both declined to read a relational element into
the explosives statute.
1°2 I n  
U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  
v .  
R o s e n
b e r g ,  
t h
e  
T h
i r d  
C i r
c u i
t
held that the statute did not contain a relational element.
1°3 I n  t h a t  c a s e ,Susan Lisa Rosenberg, a Communist r volutionary, was accused of sev-
eral crimes related to stockpiling weapons and ammunition and possess-
i g false documents. Among other things, the government charged Ro-
senberg with carrying an explosive during a felony, with the underlying
felonies being the possession of firearms.
184 T h e  T h i r d  
C i r c u i t  
a p p l i e d  
a
plain language analysis to the statute and concluded that, on its face, the
statute appeared to contain no relational element.
185 T h e  p a n e l  
d e c l i n e d
to rely on Stewart, findi g unpersuasive the Ninth Circuit's argument
that the firearms statute had always contained a relational element and
pointing out that Congress had not seen fit to change the explosives stat-
ute in a similar marmer.
106 Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. dissented on this question.
1137 H eargued that the plain meaning of the statute did contain a relational ele-
98. Judge O'Scanntain's dissent was joined by Judges Kleinfeld, Bybee, Bea, Gould, and Cal-
lahan. Id.  at 998. Additionally, Judge Alarcon, from the original panel, would have reheard the
case. I d
99. Id (O'Scamtlain, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 1000 (citing United States v. Ivy, 929 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Rosenberg, 806 F.2d 1169 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Jenkins, No. 03-5055,2005 WL 3440416
(6th Cir. 2005)).
101. Id at 1000-01.
102. Ivy, 929 F.2d 147; Rosenberg, 806 F.2d 1169.
103. Rosenberg, 806 F l d at 1179.
104. Count 5 stated that Rosenberg possessed blasting caps, switches, wire, and 199 sticks of
dynamite. The underlying felonies for this count were the possession of a sawed-off shotgun and an
Uzi semi-automatic rifle. I d  at 1176.
105. Id at 1178-79.
106. Id. at 1178.
107. Id at 1180-85 (Higgenbotham, J., dissenting).
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ment because the words "during the commission of" implied some con-
nection between the use of the explosives and the underlying felony.108
According to Judge Higginbotham, even if  the statute did not explicitly
contain a relational element, it was at least ambiguous, and thus needed
to be construed against the government."
The Fifth Circuit addressed the same statutory issue and came down
on the side of Rosenberg. I n  United States v. Ivy, the court held that a
jury instruction in that case properly omitted a relational element.
m T h edefendant in Ivy kidnapped his estranged wife and drove her across state
lines while carrying explosives in the trunk of his car!" The panel un-
animously affirmed the conviction on this count, choosing to follow Ro-
senberg without entering into a substantive discussion of the issue.
112
3. Legislative Histories of the Explosives and Firearms Statutes
Central to the Ninth Circuit's holding was the majority's belief that
the current firearms and explosives statutes are sufficiently analogous
that a case interpreting the firearms statute would be binding for a case
involving the explosives statute."
3 A l t h o u g h  
t h e  
s t a t u t e s  
h a v e  
a  
s i m i l
a r
origin, Congress has amended each in significant and different ways.
The firearms statute was enacted in 1968 without an explicit relational
requirement!" Two years later, Congress passed the explosives statute
to "carr[y] over to the explosives area the stringent provisions of the Gun
Control Act of 1968 relating to the use of firearms and the unlawful car-
rying of firearms to commit, or during the commission of a Federal fel-
ony ."
115 
T h
e n  
t
h
e  
fi
r
e
a
r
m
s  
s
t
a
t
u
t
e  
w
a
s  
a
m
e
n
d
e
d  
i
n  
1
9
8
4
,  
r
e
p
l
a
c
i
n
g  
t
h
e
108. Id. at 1181-82; see also United States v. Ressam (Ressam III) , 128 S. Ct. 1858, 1863
(2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the word "during" can imply either a temporal link or a
relational link depending on the context in which it is used).
109. Rosenberg, 806 F.2d at 1182. This dissenting opinion was repeatedly cited in Ressam's
briefs. Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant's Opening Brief, United States v. Ressam, 474 F.3d
597 (9th Cir. 2007) (Nos. 05-30422 and 05-30441), 2005 WL 4655492 [hereinafter Ressam's Open-
ing Brief to the Ninth Circuit]; Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant's Response and Reply Brief,
United States v. Ressam, 474 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2007) (Nos. 05-30422 and 05-30441), 2006 WL
2983655.
110. United States v. Ivy, 929 F.2d 147, 151 (5th Cir. 1991).
111.M at 149.
112.M at 152.
113. United States v. Ressam (Ressam /), 474 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 2007), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 1858
(2008).
114. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-618, 902,  82 Stat. 1213, 1224 (1968).
115. H.R. REP. NO. 91-1549 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4046. The cur-
rent version of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) reads:
[A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime f o r  which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or
carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in
490 S e a t t l e  University Law Review [ V o l .  32:477
word "during" with "during and in relation to" and removing the word
"unlawfully.„I16 I n  1988, however, Congress struck the word "unlaw-
fully” from the explosives statute but did not replace "during" with "dur-
ing and in relation t o "
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The amendment explicitly reflected that this amendment strengthened the
explosive statute by removing the requirement that carrying the explo-
sive be unlawful.
118 Against this legal and legislative background, the Ninth Circuit
panel in Ressam analyzed the statute, created a circuit split, and put the
Supreme Court on notice that it was time to give final resolution to the
meaning of the statute.
B. Reversal at the Supreme Court of the United States
The split between circuits was short lived because the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari on December 7, 2007:
19 O f fi c i a l s  a tthe Justice Department had privately believed that, although the case was
unlikely to be reviewed by the Supreme Cour t :
2° i f  c e r t i o r a r i  
w e r e
granted, the Ninth Circuit's opinion would be reversed:
21
addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime
18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1XA) (2006).
116. Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1005,98 Stat. 1837, 2138 (1984). Although
Congress had amended the statute by the time Stewart appealed, he had been charged under the
former version of the statute. United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538, 539 (9th Cir. 1985). The court
held that the amendment had only made explicit what had already been implicit in the statute and
that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) had always contained a relational element. Id.
117. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6474(b), 102 Stat. 4181, 4379-80
(1988). The current version of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) reads:
Whoever c a r r i e s  an explosive during the commission of any felony which may be
prosecuted in a court in the United States s h a l l ,  in addition to the punishment pro-
vided for such felony, be sentenced to imprisonment for 10 years.
18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) (2000).
118. Anti-Drug Abuse Act, § 6474(b).
119. United States v. Ressam, 128 S. Ct. 741 (2007).
120. Ignoring the importance of resolving the split between circuits, Ressam's attorneys pre-
sented a rather compelling reason for why the particular facts of his case presented a poor vehicle for
resolving the statute's meaning: whether or not the Ninth Circuit's holding was reversed, it is likely
that the trial judge will retain full discretion over the sentence, making it possible that his sentence
will not change. See Ahmed Ressam's Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at *1, United States v. Res-
sam (Ressam III), 128 S. Ct. 1858 (2008) (No. 07-455), 2007 WL 3307517 ("The question presented
is purely academic and certiorari should be denied."); see also Br ief of National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, Ressam III, 128 S. Ct. 1858 (No. 07-455), 2008 WL 527203. Indeed, in
calculating Ressam's original sentence, Judge Coughenour had presumably included Count 9, which
at trial had been instructed without a relational element and resulted in a conviction.
121. Ressam's attorneys faced several difficulties at the Supreme Court, setting aside for the
moment that the Ninth Circuit had decided the case incorrectly. See infra Part I1I.C. The Supreme
Court was not bound by Stewart as the Ninth Circuit had argued its own panel was. Additionally,
several members of the Supreme Court had expressed an unwillingness to resort to legislative history
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The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in May 2008.
122 J u s t i c e  J o h nPaul Stevens wrote for th  8-1 maj r ity .
123 I n  a  b r i e f ,  
n a r r o w  
o p i n i o n ,
I 2 4
Justice Stevens first wrote that the "most natural reading" of the word
"during" contained only a temporal link between the carrying of the ex-
plosives and the underlying felony .
125 N e x t ,  h e  
a n a l y z e d  
t h e  
l e g i s l a t i
v e
history, finding that Congress's choice to omit a relational element from
the explosives statute after adding one to the firearms statute required an
inference that Congress intended to adopt a "more straightforward" read-
ing of the explosives statute that excluded a relational element.
I26 C o n -curring in part and in judgment, Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia, both
of whom typically disclaim resorting to legislative history in a statutory
analysis,
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and congressional intent, which the Ninth Circuit opinion had relied on. See, e.g., Small v. United
States, 544 U.S. 385, 406 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Reliance on explicit statements in the
history, i f they existed, would be problematic enough. Reliance on the silence in the history is a new
and even more dangerous phenomenon."); Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004) (Ken-
nedy, J.) ("We should prefer the plain meaning because that approach respects the words of Con-
gress. In this manner we avoid the pitfalls that plague too quick of a turn to the more controversial
realm of legislative history."); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring) ("The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined, not on the basis
of which meaning can be shown to have been understood by a larger handful of the Members of
Congress; but rather on the basis of which meaning is (1) most in accord with context and ordinary
usage, and thus most likely to have been understood by the whole Congress which voted on the
words of  the statute (not to mention the citizens subject to it), and (2) most compatible with the
surrounding body of law into which the provision must be integrated—a compatibility which, by a
benign fiction, we assume Congress always has in mind.").
122. Ressam III, 128 S. Ct. at 1860.
123. M at 1859-62.
124. "The broader the agreement among the justices, the more likely it is a decision on the
narrowest possible grounds." Associated Press, Chief Justice Says His Goal Is More Consensus on
Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at Al6 (quoting Chief Justice John Roberts). A t  the same time,
greater agreement around a narrow opinion is not without its cost. The Supreme Court's reversal of
the Ninth Circuit provides an example: although Justice Stevens' opinion arrived at the correct result
and was able to do so with a wide consensus, the opinion did not set forth any clear rules of statutory
construction for future cases. This Note takes no position on which approach is more desirable from
a jurisprudential perspective.
125. Ressam HI, 128 S. Ct. at 1861.
126. Id. at 1861-62.
127. See AN  CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT 131
-
33 ( P e n g u i n  B o o k s  
2 0 0 7 )
(discussing the beliefs of  Justices Thomas and Scalia with regard to legislative history, especially
when interpreting criminal provisions of a statute).
128. Ressam HI, 128 S. Ct. at 1862 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment). Interestingly, the newest members of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, did
join the portion of the opinion that dealt with the legislative history, indicating that neither of them
subscribe to the strict brand of textualism favored by Justices Scalia and Thomas. See GREENBURG,
supra note 127.
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The lone dissenter was Justice Stephen Breyer, who would have
read a relational element into the statute.
129 H i s  o p i n i o n  
e x p r e s s e d  
s e v -
eral of  the over-breadth concerns articulated by Ressam's attorneys'"
and argued that Congress coul  not have intended for its statute to reach
this conduct.
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Congress's failure to amend the explosives law "cannot make the deter-
minative difference" in the statute's interpretation.
I32 B r e y e r ,  h o w e v e r ,also disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's r asoning that the explosives
needed to further the underlying felony: he would have allowed the rela-
tional element to also run the opposite direction, in cases—like this—in
which the underlying felony is what furthers the carrying of the explo-
sives.
133 
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lower court.
134 Nevertheless, eight members of  the Court disagreed with Justice
Breyer and the lower court. The next section of this Part compares the
majority opinion of the Supreme Court with that of the Ninth Circuit and
expands on why reversal was warranted.
C. Why Reversal of the Ninth Circuit Was Warranted
In its analysis of the explosives statute, the Ninth Circuit erred at
several points. First, because the statute contains plain language that in-
cludes only two elements,
135 t h e  
c o u r t  
d i d  
n o t  
n e e d  
t o  
p r o c e
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t o  
a
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a n a
l -
ysis of t e legislative intent and history of the statute in search of another
element. Second, even i f  the statute did merit interpretation based on
some perceived ambiguity, the court should have concluded that Con-
gress intended the statute to contain only two elements and no third rela-
tional element. Congress could have explicitly included such an element
in light of subsequent legal developments, and would have done so if  it
129. Ressam III, 128 S. Ct. at 1862-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
130. See discussion infra Part 1V.13.
131. Ressam III, 128 S. Ct. at 1863 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
132. Id at 1864.
133. M
134. Id. Justice Breyer appears to be correct in arguing that a relational element that can relate
either way could be the more desirable reading of the statute. Under this reading, conduct such as
Ressam's would remain within the reach of the statute, while more absurd hypotheticals such as the
instance of the farmer who lawfully carries explosives while committing an unrelated felony would
not incur the harsh ten-year mandatory sentence. This reading, however, ignores Supreme Court
precedent, namely a firearm case holding that the meaning of "in relation to" means that the firearm
must "facilitate or have the potential of  facilitating" the underlying offense. See Smith v. United
States, 508 U.S. 223, 238 (1993). This interpretation of the firearm statute, which governs because
Justice Breyer's opinion relies on a firearms case, precludes a relational element that can relate either
way.
135. See infra Part III.C.1.
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had intended the statute to contain a relational element. I t  chose not to.
Third, the court erred by relying on United States v. Stewart,
I36 w h i c hinterpreted a firearms statute, because the reasoning employed in that
case was undermined by subsequent Supreme Court precedent.
1. The Court Did Not Need to Go Beyond the Plain Meaning
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the explosives statute should
have ended with the statute's plain language.
137 A  p l a i n - l a n g u a g e  
a n a l y -
sis is required as a threshold matter
138 a n d  w a s  
n o t  
p e r f o r m e d  
i n  
t h e
Ninth Circuit's decision. I f  the court had analyzed the plain language of
the statute, it  would have found that the statute required no relational
element.
139 The Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have
both urged judges to first look to the plain meaning of the statute before
engaging in other means of determining the meaning of the statute.
1413On a pragmatic level, this urging shows a preference for clear and known
statutory language over legislative history, which tends to be confusing,
unknown, and perhaps illegitimate.
141 T h e  N i n t h  
C i r c u i t ,  
h o w e v e r
,  
n e v e
r
engaged in such an analysis in Ressam, in part because the court did not
perform such an analysis in Stewart.
142 T h u s ,  
a c c o r d i n g  
t o  
p o l i c y  
a n d
136. United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538 (9th Cir. 1985).
137. See Ressam III, 128 S. Ct. at 1862 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) M l l e  plain language of  the statute squarely answers the question presented in this
case."); see also Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984) (Rehnquist, J.) ("When we find the
terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, except in 'rare and exceptional circum-
stances.'"); United States v. Trident Seafoods Corp., 92 F.3d 855, 862 (9th Cir. 2000) (Mi l '  the
statutory language is clear, we need look no further than that language itself in determining the
meaning of the statute.").
138. Lamle v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 538 (2004); Trident, 92 F.3d at 862.
139. Ressam III, 128 S. Ct. at 1862 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment).
140. See, e.g., Garcia, 469 U.S. at 75; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 665 (2006) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) ("We have repeatedly held that such reliance [on legislative history] is impermissible
where, as here, the statutory language is unambiguous."); Trident, 92 F.3d at 862.
141. Compare Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 580 n.10 (pointing out that statements in legislative history
for Detainee Treatment Act that were inserted into the record after the vote were less legitimate than
those spoken prior to the vote), with id. at 665 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Whether the floor statements
are spoken where no Senator hears, or written where no Senator reads, they represent at most the
view of one Senator."). For  a further discussion of this controversy, see Emily Bazelon, Invisible
Men: D id Lindsay Graham and Jon Kyl  Mislead the Supreme Court?, SLATE, Mar. 27, 2006,
http://www.slate.comild/2138750 (last visited Nov. 18, 2008).
142. See United States v. Ressam (Ressam I), 474 F.3d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 2007) (proceeding
directly to a discussion of the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. 844(h)(2)) ; United States v. Stewart,
779 F l d 538 (9th Cir. 1985) (proceeding directly to a discussion of  the legislative history of  18
U.S.C. § 924(c)).
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doctrine, the court skipped a necessary step in discerning meaning from
the text of the explosives statute.
I43 Performing this necessary analysis supports the proposition that 18
U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) contains no third, relational element. Webster's Dic-
tionary defines "during" as "throughout the duration of' or "at a point in
the course o f . "
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meaning is to carry an explosive at a point during the course of carrying
a felony into action.
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reading, but instead the first element of "carrying an explosive" and the
second element th t the carrying occur "at a point during the course of
carrying the felony into action." The majority of the opinions interpret-
ing the statute read it in a similar way.148 Choosing not to follow these
cases, the panel in  Ressam found an ambiguity where none existed,
which allowed it to reach a legislative history that the court still misread.
143. This is not to say that an ambiguous statute should never be construed in light of the intent
of Congress. See, e.g., Offshore Logistics Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222 (1986) (O'Connor,
J.). A n  argument could be made that the term "carries an explosive during the commission of a
felony" is ambiguous, thus legitimizing a resort to legislative history. See Ressam 111, 128 S. Ct. at
1863 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The statute's language does not demand such an interpretation.
Context makes the difference."); Transcript of Oral Arguments at 4, 128 S. Ct. 741 (2008) (No. 07-
455), 2008 WL 779246 (Question of Roberts, C.J.) ( " If I say, you know, I  hung lights during the
holiday season, you wouldn't think that I hung a chandelier, right? There'd be not simply a temporal
connection, but also a relation."). Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit, arguing that i t was bound by
Stewart, never attempted to argue that the statute had an ambiguous meaning in Ressam. See Res-
Sam 1, 474 F.3d at 603-04. Then-Judge Kennedy never performed this analysis in Stewart, either.
See Stewart, 779 F.2d 538.
144. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 388 (11th ed. 2005). Al though the
dictionary definition supports both the government's and the Court majority's interpretation of the
statute, the majority opinion reasoned that there was no need to consult a dictionary definition of the
word "during," as its most natural meaning includes only a temporal link between the carrying of the
explosive and the underlying federal felony. Ressam 111, 128 S. Ct. at 1861.
145. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 144, at 249.
146. M at 250.
147. See also Government's Opening Brief to the Ninth Circuit, supra note 75, at 37 (rephras-
ing the plain meaning as "carries an explosive at some point in perpetrating any felony.").
148. See Ressam III, 128 S. Ct. at 1858 (Stevens, J.); id. at 1862 (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment); United States v. Ivy, 929 F.2d 147, 151 (5th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Rosenberg, 806 F.2d 1169, 1178-79 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that "during" carried the plain mean-
ing of "at the same time" or "at a point in the course of"); United States v. Ressam (Ressam 1), 474
F.3d 597, 605-06 (9th Cir. 2007) (Alarcon, J., dissenting), rev 'd, 128 S. Ct. 1858 (2008); United
States v. Ressam (Ressam 11), 491 F.3d 997, 998 (9th Cir. 2007) (denial of  rehearing en bane)
(O'Scannlain, J., dissenting); but see Rosenberg, 806 F.2d at 1180-81 (Higgenbotham, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that the phrase "during the commission of'  necessarily connected the possession of
illegal explosives to the perpetration of some other felonious act).
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2. Congress Never Intended a Relational
Element in the Explosives Statute
Congress never intended to include a relational element in the ex-
plosives statute. At  best, the original statute is vague as to whether there
should be an element that requires a relationship. Moreover, subsequent
congressional action and inaction demonstrates that, after taking into ac-
count the presumption that Congress knows what statutes it has enacted
and how the judiciary has interpreted them, it did not intend that the stat-
ute have a relational element. With the significant differences between
the nature of the laws governing the carrying of a firearm during a felony
and the carrying of an explosive during a felony, Congress had good rea-
son to include a relational element with the firearms statute but not with
the explosives statute.
i. No Evidence Demonstrates that Congress
Intended a Relational Element
The Ninth Circuit majority argued in Ressam that Congress always
intended that the explosives statute contain a relational element;
149 h o w -ever, this intent in the original statute is not as clear as the Ninth Circuit
suggested. Cit ing the original House Report, which stated Congress's
intent to "[carry] over to the explosives area the stringent provisions of
the Gun Control Act of 1968 relating to the use of firearms and the un-
lawful carrying of firearms to commit, or during the commission of a
federal felony ,"
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read the same and contain the same amount of elements.
I51 H o w e v e r ,this seemingly common origin provides very little to an interpretation of
the current version of the explosives statute. Subsequent congressional
and judicial acts, as well as the differences in the statutes' purposes,
show that Congress could not have rationally intended the statutes in
their present form to be read in a parallel manner.
I52
Evidence that Congress Did Not Intend a Relational Element
Even i f  the statute did initially contain a relational element, or i f
there was ambiguity as to whether it did, Congress has manifested its
149. Ressam I, 474 F.3d at 602-03; see also Ressam III, 128 S. Ct. at 1863 (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing) ("1 cannot imagine why Congress would have wanted the presence of totally irrelevant, lawful
behavior to trigger an additional 10-year mandatory prison term.").
150. H.R. Rep. 91-1549, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4046.
151. Ressam 1 ,
4 7 4  F .
3 d  
a t  
6 0 2 -
0 3 .
152. For a more thorough discussion of the limits of the statutory canon of in pail materia as it
applies to this case and statute, see Peter Moreno, Note & Comment, Defusing the Bomb: The Scope
of  the Federal Explosives Statute, 82 WASH. L. REV 1007 (2007).
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intention that the present version of the statute contain no relational ele-
ment. Congress manifested this intention, first, when it chose to add a
relational element to the firearms statute
153 b u t  n o t  t h e  
e x p l o s i v e s  
s t a t -
ute
15
4 
a
n
d
,  
s
e
c
o
n
d
,  
t
h
r
o
u
g
h  
i
t
s  
i
n
a
c
t
i
o
n  
t
o  
a
m
e
n
d  
t
h
e  
s
t
a
t
u
t
e  
a
f
t
e
r  
m
o
r
e
than twenty years since the Rosenberg
155 d e c i s i o n .First, Congress's disparate treatment of the explosives and firearms
statutes indicates that even if  the statutes contained a common origin, the
two statutes are no longer sufficiently analogous that interpretations of
the firearms statute can govern interpretations of the explosives statute.
There could be no clearer evidence of Congress's intent that 18 U.S.C. §
844(h)(2) contain no relational element than the fact that Congress
amended the firearms statute to include the relational element
156 b u t  d i dnot similarly amend the explosives statute.
157 I f  t h e  
S t e w a r t  
c o u r t  
w a s
correct in saying that Congress "intended to make clear a condition al-
ready implic it"
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language, then it remains unexplained why Congress did not see fit to
make xplicit the same element that would be implicit in the explosives
statute.'"
Ressam's attorneys attempted to dispose of this argument by raising
the issue of how Congress actually makes laws: the body clarified the
firearm statute because it was "used far more frequently and, therefore,
more likely in the forefront o f  Congressional awareness."
1613 I n  o t h e r
153. Act of October 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1005, 98 Stat. 1837, 2138 (1984).
154. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6474(b), 102 Stat. 4181, 4379-80
(1988).
155. See 806 F ld 1169 (3d Cir. 1986); see also discussion supra Part 111.A.2.
156. Act of October 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1005,98 Stat. 1837, 2138 (1984).
157. United States v. Ressam (Ressam 1), 474 F.3d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 2007).
158. United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538, 539 (9th Cir. 1985).
159. At oral arguments before the Ninth Circuit, a panel judge stated her opinion that the time-
line of the Stewart case completely explained Congress's failure to add similar "in relation to" lan-
guage to the explosives statute. According to this line of  argument, Congress would have known
that a decision had interpreted the firearms statute to have always included a relational element, and
would have expected this decision to extend to the explosives statute. Thus, i t would have felt no
need to include the language. Ressam Oral Arguments Before the Ninth Circuit, supra note 12.
Justice Breyer made a similar suggestion in his dissenting opinion. United States v. Ressam (Res-
sam 111), 128 S. Ct. 1853, 1865 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Congress is presumed to be aware
of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-
enacts that statute without change." (emphasis added) (quoting Lorrilard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580
(1978)). This argument is without merit. Congress would not have presumed that one decision
interpreting a different statute, by a three-judge panel within one of thirteen federal courts of appeal,
would have made clear its intent for a law governing the entire nation. The timeline theory was not
included in the court's written opinion.
160. Ressam's Opening Brief to the Ninth Circuit, supra note 109, at 30-31 ("[L]ittle, i f any,
significance should be attached to Congressional inaction on the relatively unused * 844(h)(2) mere-
ly because Congress clarified § 924(c), a statute used far more frequently and, therefore, more likely
in the forefront of Congressional awareness.").
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words, Congress simply forgot about 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) because it
was not charged as often.
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lid.
Ressam's argument is not legally valid because Congress is pre-
sumed to know the law and existing interpretations by the judiciary.162
Thus, the courts will not engage in an examination of whether members
of Congress were subjectively aware of the state of their own enacted
legislation and the existing judicial interpretations of the IftW.
163 F u r -thermore, even if  this were a legally valid argument, it is not factually
valid, because it rests on the faulty premise that Congress was unaware
of the differences between the statutes. I n  fact, Congress amended an-
other section of  18 U.S.C. § 844 in the same legislation in which it
amended the firearms statute to add the "in relation to" language.' T h i s
strongly supports an interpretation of the statute without a relational ele-
ment: Congress had the chance to similarly amend the explosives statute
to include such an element, was aware of the differences it was creating
between the statutes, but chose to leave 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) in its pre-
sent form.
165 Second, the decision of Congress to not include a relational element
in light of Rosenberg is strong evidence that Congress never intended the
explosives statute to include a relational element. Decided in 1986, the
court in Rosenberg set forth a clear interpretation of the explosives stat-
ute, namely that Congress did not intend the statute to include a rela-
tional element.
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relational element to the explosives statute as it had to the firearms stat-
ute.167 Congress's failure to do so for the twenty years prior to Ressam is
evidence that the Court in Rosenberg correctly held that the statute con-
tains only two elements, especially given the presumption that Congress
knows the law and the surrounding judicial interpretations.
I68 S i m i l a r
161. See also Ressam III, 128 S. Ct. at 1865 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ( "Mlle omission of the
language may reflect simple drafting inadvertence.").
162. See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 699 (1979); U.S. v. Mueller, 463
F.3d 887, 891 (9th Cir. 2006).
163. C l  Russell° v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) ("[W]here Congress includes par-
ticular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is gener-
ally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclu-
sion.").
164. Act of October 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1014, 98 Stat. 1837, 2142 (1984) (amend-
ing subsections (d), (0, and (i) of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)).
165. See Ressam III, 128 S. Ct. at 1862.
166. United States v. Rosenberg, 806 F.2d 1169, 1179 (3d Cir. 1986).
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 699 (1979); U.S. v. Mueller, 463
F.3d 887, 891 (9th Cir. 2006).
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arguments were made by Judges Alarcon and O'Scannlain in dissent of
the Ninth Circuit Ressam decisions. 169 Although not included in the Su-
preme Court opinion, Congress's failure to amend the explosives statute
strengthens the likelihood that Congress made an intentional, policy-
based decision to exclude a relational element.
Congress's Choice to Exclude a Relational Element
Was a Rational Policy Determination
The significant differences between firearms and explosives them-
selves suggest that Congress likely made a policy choice to omit a rela-
tional element from the explosives statute, but not the firearms statute.
Congress's policy of imposing more stringent penalties when the device
plays a role in a crime'" requires a relationship between the firearm and
the underlying felony, but the same is not true of explosives. First, inci-
dental and unrelated possession is more likely for a firearm than for an
explosive, giving Congress good reason to be more concerned with over-
breadth in the firearms statute but not with the explosives statute. Gun
ownership, a judicially-recognized constitutional right, is prevalent in
America.
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rogue police officer who might commit a federal felony while lawfully
carrying his state-issued g u n
1 7 2
- - a  s i m i l a r  
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explosives statute.
Second, the harm presented by firearms is significantly different
than that presented by  explosives. Explosives create indiscriminate
harm, and although firearms can be quite harmful in their own right, their
harm is at least discriminate.
173 A  fi r e a r m  
g e n e r a l l y  
d o e s  
n o t  
d i s c h
a r g e
on its own, unlike an unstable explosive.
174 T h u s ,  a  
h i d d e n  
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i
an ever-present d nger to others, while a firearm that is never brandished
presents almost no risk to others.
175 A h m e d  
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a
169. United States v. Ressam (Ressam 1), 474 F.3d 597, 607 (9th Cir. 2007) (Alarcon, J., dis-
senting), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 1858 (2008); United States v. Ressam (Ressam 11), 491 F.3d 997, 999 (9th
Cir. 2007) (denial of rehearing en bane) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
170. H.R. Rep. 91-1549, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4046.
171. U.S. CONST. amend II; Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
172. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, supra note 143.
173. Id at 10-11 (argument of Att'y Gen. Michael Mukasey).
174. See Ressam 11, 491 F.3d at 999 n.1 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
175. But see United States v. Steward, 16 F.3d 317, 320 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a defen-
dant could have violated firearms statute by carrying handgun in waistband during drug deal, despite
never brandishing the weapon). The firearms statute also prescribes different penalties for "carry-
ing" a firearm during and in relation to a federal violent crime or drug felony (five years), "brandish-
ing" the firearm during and in relation to a federal violent crime or drug felony (seven years), and
"using" the firearm during and in relation to a federal violent crime or drug felony (ten years). 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006).
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good example. When Ressam was apprehended, a customs official, who
believed Ressam was transporting drugs, shook a container of brown liq-
uid, causing Ressam to duck and cover.
I76 L a t e r ,  
o f fi c i a l s  
l e a r n e d  
t h a t
the liquid was a highly unstable relative of nitroglycerine:
77 L a w  e n -forcement officials also transported the material to a facility for examina-
tion without knowing its true composition, which placed them in serious
danger.
178 Thus, the Ninth Circuit's holding that 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) must
contain a relational element was flawed for several reasons. The court
unnecessarily went beyond a plain-language analysis of  the statute; it
incorrectly analyzed legislative history and congressional intent; and it
ignored Congress's rational policy choice to criminalize the carrying of
an explosive during a felony more harshly than the carrying of a firearm.
Despite this mountain of evidence, the Ninth Circuit majority defended
its opinion based on the erroneous premise that "[u]nlike our colleagues
in other circuits, we do not write on a clean s l a t e "
7 9
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tional element into a firearms statute.
3. The Court Should Not Have Relied on Stewart
Stewart itself has never been explicitly overruled—nor would it
need to be because Congress has already changed the firearm statute to
include the relational element that the Stewart court presumed.'" A s
Judges Alarcon and O'Scannlain argued in their dissents, 182 however, the
reasoning from Stewart was significantly weakened by a subsequent Su-
preme Court opinion, Lamie v. US. Trustee.
183 Lamle, not Stewart, should have guided the Ninth Circuit's analysis
for three reasons. First, the Court's holding in Lamle prohibits courts
from adding absent words into a statute;
184 t h e  R e s s a m  
c o u r t  
n o t  
o n l y
176. Bemton et al., supra note 49.
178. Mike Caner &  Steve Miletich, Scare over Ressam's Chemicals Described, SEATTLE
TIMES, Mar. 17, 2001, at Bl .
179. United States v. Ressam (Ressam I), 474 F.3d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 2007). In fact, one of the
judges in the majority stated: "Whether 1 agree with [the Third Circuit] or  not seems to be fairly
beside the point given Stewart." Ressam Oral Arguments Before the Ninth Circuit, supra note 12.
She also stated: "1 wouldn't read [a relational element] in, period, but the point is that it was done. I t
was done. And I don't understand how we're free in this circuit to say it wasn't always so." Id.
180. United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538 (9th Cir. 1985).
181. Act of October 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1005,98 Stat. 1837, 2138 (1984).
182. Ressam 1 ,
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491 F.3d 997, 1000 (9th Cir. 2007) (denial of rehearing en bane) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
183. 540 U.S. 526 (2004).
184. Id. at 534.
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added absent words, but it added an otherwise absent element. Second,
the Court in Lamie stated that when a statute is clear on its face, a reme-
dial analysis of legislative history is impermissible.
185 T h i s  h o l d i n g  
i s
inconsistent with t e Ressam court's reading o f  an element into 18
U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) based solely on the supposed intent of  Congress.
Third, the Court in Lamle articulated that, in recognition of the separa-
tion o f  powers between branches, rewriting a plain statute is not the
province of the courts, but of Congress.
186 T h e s e  
p r i n c i p l e s  
a r e  
a l l  
i n c o n -
sistent with the Ninth Circuit including a relational element in 18 U.S.C.
§ 844(h)(2).
First, the Court in Lamie held that the court may not write absent
words into a statute, regardless of congressional intent.'" I n  the statu-
tory regime at issue in Lamie, Congress had removed the words "or to
the debtor's attorney" from a list of people who could be compensated
for services under the Bankruptcy Code.'" The resulting change from
the previous statute was a clear drafting error, indicated in part by gram-
matical errors in the new language of  the statute.
189 R e g a r d l e s s ,  
t h e
Court chose not to insert the e missing words into the current version of
he statute.'" I f  the Supreme Court was unwilling to correct an obvious
drafting error by adding missing language, then the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion to add a relational element to the otherwise unambiguous explosives
statute was impermissible.
Second, the Court in Lamie proscribed resorting to legislative his-
tory for the purpose of repairing a plain statute.
191 D e s p i t e  t h e  
c o m p e l -
ling legislative his ory suggesting that Congress had made an unintended
error when it amended the Bankruptcy Code, the Lamie Court refused to
use previous versions of the statute at issue to discern congressional in-
tent; the Court instead read the statute as it  plainly appeared with the
drafting error.
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Lamie adopted a prudential approach in order to avoid the concerns with
legislative his tory .
193 
I n d e e d ,  
J u s t i
c e  
K e n
n e d y  
a d v
o c a
t e d  
a  
p l
a i
n -
185. Id at 539-40.
186. Id at 542.
187. Id at 534.
188. Id at 530.
189. Id
190. Id at 538.
191. Id at 539-40.
192. Id
193. Compare Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 580 n.I0 (pointing out that statements in
legislative history for Detainee Treatment Act that were inserted into the record after the vote were
less legitimate than those spoken prior to the vote), with id. at 665 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Whether
the floor statements are spoken where no Senator hears, or written where no Senator reads, they
represent at most the view of one Senator."). See also Bazelon, supra note 141.
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language analysis when possible because "[i]n this manner we avoid the
pitfalls that plague too quick a turn to the more controversial realm of
legislative his tory ."
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supports the plain meaning of the statute, an analysis of legislative his-
tory is unnecessary and contradictory to the Court's reasoning in Lamie.
Third, the Court in Lamle articulated that because of the relation-
ship among the respective branches the judiciary must defer to the words
of Congress.
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intent o f  Congress, it  is  solely within the discretion o f  Congress to
change the language of the provis ion.
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writing for the majority, this reflects "deference to the supremacy of the
Legislature, as well as recognition that Congressmen typically vote on
the language of the b il l . "
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such as the one found in Lamie—and certainly for a statute with a rea-
sonable interpretation such as the explosives statute—the right to make
substantive changes lies with Congress and not the courts.
Despite the inconsistencies between the reasoning in Lamie and the
addition of a relational element in Ressam, the majority in Ressam at-
tempted to distinguish these cases.
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not articulate a new rule of statutory interpretation; it did not construe §
844(h)(2) or § 924(c), and there was no prior construction of a similar
statute to contend with."
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uthority and the reasoning behind it is not persuasive.
Despite the majority's insistence that Lamie was inapplicable, no
principled distinction exists between the reasoning in Lamle and the rea-
soning which should have applied in Ressam. Whether Lamie articulated
a new rule of statutory construction or merely re-articulated prior rules,
its central holdings, namely that the courts cannot read an absent word
into a statute and that plain language analysis precedes legislative intent,
do not square with the method of inquiry utilized in Stewart or Ressam.
Furthermore, it is unpersuasive to argue that Lamie is inapposite because
the Court did not interpret the explosives or firearms statute. Taken to its
extreme, this logic would limit courts to the canons of construction ar-
ticulated only in previous cases dealing with the same statute in ques-
tion—an absurd result that is in no way reflective of the way courts actu-
ally utilize the principles of statutory interpretation. Finally, the Ressam
194. Lamle, 540 U.S. at 536.
195. M at 542.
196. Id
197. Id at 538.
198. United States v. Ressam (Ressam /), 474 F.3d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 2007), rev'd, 128 S. Ct.
1858 (2008).
199. Id
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court's statement that Lamie did not involve prior construction of a simi-
lar statute is factually accurate, but proves very little, because Lamie, just
as Ressam, included a discussion about whether a court should analyze
the previous version of a statute when the modern version of the same
statute is under review.
200 The Ressam court, therefore, was incorrect in stating that it  was
constrained to follow Stewart, and in so holding, attempted to create
precedent that could have hindered the government's ability to prosecute
dangerous crimes as Congress intended.
IV.  Ho w A RELATIONAL ELEMENT WOULD AFFECT
THE SCOPE OF THE EXPLOSIVES STATUTE
In both the briefing and at oral argument, the parties expressed pru-
dential concerns about the proper scope 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2). Accord-
ing to Ressam's attorneys, i f  the explosives statute contained no rela-
tional element, i t  would criminalize conduct that reasonable people
would not understand to be forbidden.
201 A l t h o u g h  
t h e  
g o v e r n m e n t  
c o n -
ceded that the statute was very broad,
m i t  a r g u e d  
t h a t  t h e  
o n d u c t  
R e s -
sam's attorneys described were extreme examples that would be met
with prosecutorial discretion, and that a narrow reading of  the statute
would decriminalize conduct similar to Ressam's, against Congress's
intent.
21:13Congressional motives for making the law should not be dispositive
because it is not the court's role to soften facially plain statutes that Con-
gress intended to be harsh.
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200. Lamie, 540 U.S. at 531.
201. Ressam's Opening Brief to the Ninth Circuit, supra note 109, at 33-34. According to
Ressam's brief, the statute without a relational element would encompass "a farmer who is carrying
dynamite in a pickup truck so he could blow up stumps on the farm, and commits an environmental
felony by unlawfully discharging a toxic substance into a waterway." Id. The brief further states
that the government's reading of § 844(h)(2) would also reach
a police officer who, while lawfully carrying a loaded handgun, accepts a bribe or com-
mits a criminal civil rights violation involving bodily injury (see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 242
and 666) unrelated to his possession of a handgun. Ordinary people would not under-
stand that the carrying of an explosive during the commission of these other felonies is it-
self a criminal violation with a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years in prison.
Id. Justice Breyer, dissenting in the Supreme Court opinion, raised similar overbreadth concerns.
United States v. Ressam (Ressam III), 128 S. Ct. 1858,1863 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
202. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, supra note 143. Attorney General Michael Mukasey, in
his first argument before the Court, conceded that the term "any felony" could not be any broader.
He argued, however, that Congress knew that Title 18 of the United States Code was "chockablock"
with felonies and intentionally omitted a relational element to sweep in the type of harmful conduct
demonstrated by Ressam. Id.
203. Ressam Oral Arguments Before the Ninth Circuit, supra note 12.
204. Lamle v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526,538 (2004).
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lution of the issue, however, it is still relevant to ask about the breadth of
the statute both with and without a relational element. Congress is free
to amend the statute in the future should it wish to place further limits on
what charges federal prosecutors may bring under 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2).
Although the statute might have the possibility of criminalizing seem-
ingly innocent conduct without a relational element, a relational element
has the potential to constrict the scope of the explosives statute to ex-
clude dangerous and culpable conduct.
A. The Statute Could be Overbroad Without a Relational Element
In 1988, Congress strengthened the provision of the explosives sta-
tute by criminalizing the carrying of an explosive during the commission
of a felony.
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lawful" from the statute, prosecutors could charge a defendant with car-
rying an explosive during a felony even when carrying the explosive it-
self was legal.
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lawfulness requirement might have made the statute too broad by impos-
ing a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence for acts that are not rea-
sonably expected to be treated so harshly.
207 T h u s ,  
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strengthened the statute too much, and incentivized courts to read the
provision as including a relational element.
Early in the government's oral argument during the Ninth Circuit
Ressam appeal, it  became clear that the court was concerned with the
breadth of the statute, and that this prudential concern would inform the
court's decision. This overbreadth concern was evident in the following
exchange between U.S. Attorney John McKay and one of the Ninth Cir-
uit judges:
Judge: Doesn't this come out with extremely bizarre results if  there
is no relationship requirement? I f ,  for example, Mr. Ressam was a
licensed dynamite practitioner, driving across the border in order to
go to a construction site or a mine in Washington and use his dyna-
mite, and in the meanwhile he happened to be carrying something
else that he didn't want the customs to know about, like diamonds,
and they asked him what he had and he said nothing, he would have
violated the statute as you construe it.
McKay: That is correct, Your Honor.
205. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6474(b), 102 Stat. 4181,4379-80
(1988).
206. Id.
207. See United States v. Ressam (Ressam HA 128 S. Ct. 1858,1863 (2008) (Breyer, J., dis-
senting).
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Judge: What is the logic of that?
McKay: [I ]  would suggest that, under that extremely unusual sce-
nario, that it  would be up to the government to decide whether to
indict under those facts.
Judge: But why would anyone write a statute like that? Once you
take the "unlawfully" out, so that you can have a perfectly lawful
carrying of explosives—and that's not unusual, people do lawfully
carry explosives.
McKay: In the extreme facts that Your Honor relates, the Govern-
ment would have the option to seek an indictment under section
844(h)
Judge: But that's not the question. Th e  question is why would
Congress write a statute like that?
McKay: Because Congress has simply determined that committing
a felony while carrying explosives is a hugely harmful crime which
is going to result in a very harsh sentence, and in this case, it  is a
perfect example o f  why there should be such a requirement. Mr .
Ressam was carrying explosives while committing a felony
[T]o require the government to prove that he carried explosives in
order to facilitate giving false names and failing to declare would be
extremely unfortunate if  that were the only charge?"
The judge's hypothetical demonstrates how the statute might crimi-
nalize conduct in which the explosives are incidentally present, play no
role in the accomplishment of the underlying felony, and bear no relation
to the crime. T o  add an even more extreme scenario, consider the out-
come i f  a person, from his own home computer, obtained private infor-
mation from a United States agency, a  federal fe lo n y,
2
"  w h i l e  h a v i n g
explosives nearby in a similar manner to Ressam. Under a strict reading
of the statut , this conduct would also be subject to a ten-year mandatory
minimum sentence for carrying an explosive during a felony.
Although these hypotheticals show that Congress is often unable to
perfectly ta ilor a statute to fit  the policy goals which that statute ad-
dresses, courts are not free to try to achieve a more perfect reading based
on their own sense o f  congressional policy. Th e  reading o f  the statute
without a relational element does criminalize conduct, such as the exam-
ples discussed above, that fall outside the policy goals. Congress must
208. Ressam Oral Arguments Before the Ninth Circuit, supra note 12.
209. 18 U.S.C. * 1030 (2006).
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often choose between over-inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness in a
statute. On which side to err, however, is a legislative policy choice that
is solely within the province of Congress, not the courts.
Furthermore, the hypothetical examples set forth by the Ninth Cir-
cuit judge and by Ressam's attorneys are just those—hypotheticals. Al-
though the examples of the farmer and the explosives contractor involved
technical violations of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) where the statute is read to
contain no relational element, the government has never attempted to
prosecute such a case in which explosives are incidentally present. In-
deed, as the government argued in its merit brief to the Supreme Court,
l i l t  is telling in this regard that respondent is unable to identify any ac-
tual prosecutions that resemble the hypothetical ones that he pos its ."
21)Thus, Congress could have rationally concluded that these extreme in-
stances would be met with prosecutorial discretion and never brought to
tr ia1,
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which carrying the explosive did not further the underlying crime but
still evinced dangerous and culpable conduct that is deserving of a ten-
year mandatory minimum sentence.
212
B. Adding a Relational Element Narrows the Scope
of the Statute Beyond Congressional Intent
I f  a relational element did exist, federal prosecutors would be more
limited in the convictions they could obtain under 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2).
With instances like Ressam's conduct, when the explosive is part of the
overall plan or scheme and presents the type of danger that 18 U.S.C. §
844(h)(2) is designed to criminalize, a relational element would constrict
the scope of the statute beyond Congress's intent. To illustrate this prin-
ciple, consider the hypothetical situations below, where a requirement
that the carrying of the explosives further the underlying felony could
prevent the government from convicting under 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2).
First, consider an anti-abortion protest, where several people use
physical force and intimidation to block the entrance to a clinic that pro-
vides reproductive health services. After  the protesters are arrested for
violating the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, a federal fel-
ony,213 one individual is found to have been concealing a stick of dyna-
210. Brief for the United States at 31, United States v. Ressam (Ressam III), 128 S. Ct. 1858
(2008) (No. 07- 455), 2008 WL 189554.
211. See id.
212. This Note's conclusion argues that the current reading of the explosives statute to contain
no relational element, endorsed by the Supreme Court, will retain its effectiveness only i f federal
prosecutors exercise discretion in choosing not to prosecute the more extreme examples of the stat-
ute's broad reach. See discussion infra Part V.
213. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2006).
506 S e a t t l e  University Law Review [ V o l .  32:477
mite on his person. Suppose that, as in Ressam, this protester intended to
blow the clinic up. Yet, with a requirement that the explosive further the
underlying felony, a prosecutor would find it difficult to obtain a convic-
tion of the protester and would-be bomber under 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2)
because the defendant could argue that the carrying of explosives did not
actually assist the protestor in physically blocking access to the clinic.
Second, envision a terrorist, who, hoping to avoid scrutiny at a
heavily-traveled entrance to a federal courthouse and with the ultimate
goal of creating an explosion in another part of the building, forges a
government employee badge and falsely pretends to be an employee of
the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 912.
214 B e f o r e  h e  
c a n  g e t
through s curity, however, the t rrorist raises the suspicion of the guard
and is apprehended. O n  his person, police recover explosive devices.
Again, as in Ressam and the earlier hypothetical, there is little question
that the forgery and false statements were part of the overall scheme to
detonate the explosive. I f  the government, however, were required to
prove a relational element similar to that required in Ressam, the defen-
dant here could make a strong argument against conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) because the carrying of the explosives did not facili-
tate the use of the false documentation.
Finally, consider a drug cartel that traffics cocaine into the United
States across a land border. A  member of the cartel attempts to smuggle
cocaine past a customs official by hiding it beneath the seats of his car.
As additional security for storage of the cocaine, the trafficker carries
explosives in the trunk of the vehicle. The customs official searches the
vehicle and finds the drugs and the explosives, and the government tries
to charge the defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2), with the underlying
felony being violation of the Controlled Substances Import and Export
Ac t .
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sives facilitate or further the underlying felony would allow these defen-
dants, who had the motive and the means to use explosives in connection
with other federal felonies, to avoid the intentionally harsh penalties of
18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2).
These three examples would yield convictions under the Supreme
Court's interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) but would likely result in
acquittals if  the government were required to prove a relational element.
As the government's attorney stated at oral argument in Ressam, the lat-
ter result would be "extremely unfortunate."
2I6 T h e s e  
h y p o t h e t i c a l  
s i t u a -
tions would, on the basis of the mere presence of the explosives, present
214./d. § 912.
215.21 U.S.C. § 952 (2006).
216. Ressam Oral Arguments Before the Ninth Circuit, supra note 12.
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great danger to doctors and patients at the abortion clinic, to security of-
ficers and occupants of the federal building, and to customs officials and
police officers at the border. Ahmed Ressam's possession of explosives
similarly placed ferry passengers, customs officials, the officers who ap-
prehended Ressam, and the investigators who handled the explosives in
serious danger,
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fying his name to enter the United States.
2I8 This danger seems to be part of what Congress hoped to deter and
punish with the broad language of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2). In drafting the
original statute, Congress wished to "carry over to the explosives area the
stringent provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968 relating to the use of
firearms and the unlawful carrying of firearms to commit, or during the
commission of a federal felony."
219 I n  o t h e r  
w o r d s ,  
C o n g r e s
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s
statute to be harsh and to punish conduct such as that of Ressam and the
other examples explained above.
Congress's choice to exclude a relational element has historically
assisted the government in prosecuting terrorists. According to the gov-
ernment's petition for certiorari, "this case provides an apt illustration of
why the Court of Appeal's holding will make it more difficult to obtain
appropriate punishment in situations where the government foils an act
of terrorism before the plan is put into action."
2213 S e v e r a l  o f  
t h e  f e w  
c a s -
es on record in which the carrying of explosives during a felony was not
in furtherance of that felony involve terrorism. These cases include Res-
sam, Rosenberg, and United States v. fenk ins,
221 a n  u n p u b l i s h e d  
S i x t h
Circuit opinion in which the defendant stole explosives with the goal of
"taking out" two county jails and a federal building. A  relational ele-
ment, therefore, could seriously weaken the prosecutorial options against
terrorist suspects.
Congress faces inherent difficulties when attempting to draft a stat-
ute such as 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) where it would like to criminalize the
dangerous use of explosives during the commission of a federal felony,
but it does not wish to harshly penalize more innocent activity. On one
hand, the absence of a relational element might unduly criminalize con-
duct that should not result in the imposition of  a mandatory, consecu-
tively-running ten-year prison sentence. On the other hand, the presence
217. See discussion supra Part
218. See discussion supra Part II.A.
219. H.R. Rep. 91-1549 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4046 (emphasis added).
This report, as related to firearms, occurred before Congress amended the statute in 1984 to narrow
its scope.
220. Petition for a Writ of  Certiorari at 10, United States v. Ressam, 128 S. Ct. 1858 (2008)
(No. 07-455), 2007 WL 2898699.
221. No. 03-5055, 2005 WL 3440416, at *363 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 2005).
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of a relational element might limit the scope beyond what Congress has
intended to criminalize, such as situations including the conduct of Res-
sam and other defendants prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2).
The difficulty of this decision, as it relates to the scope of the stat-
ute, demonstrates that the choice is policy-related and belongs with Con-
gress. Judge O'Scartnlain's dissent in the denial of an en banc rehearing
articulated these separation of powers concerns. According to Judge
O'Scannlain, reading "in relation to" into 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) "usurped
the congressional function."
222 C i t i n g  
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branch."
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criminalize the use o f  explosives or whether to leave some behavior
where the explosives present a danger to the public—is a legislative
choice.
V. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's Ressam decision was neither a proper applica-
tion of the law governing the possession of explosives during the com-
mission of a felony nor a proper application of the current hierarchy of
canons of statutory construction. The decision provides an instance of a
court exceeding its interpretive function and passing judicial legislation.
The Ninth Circuit, thus, should not have written the relational element
into the statute. The Supreme Court correctly vindicated this error.
The Ninth Circuit panel ran afoul of established legal principles and
sound logic at several points. First, the court ignored basic principles of
statutory interpretation, namely that a facially plain statute requires no
examination of legislative history or intent, and the judiciary may not
read absent words or elements into a statute. I n  failing to follow these
canons of construction, the court not only failed to follow precedent but
also usurped the legislative function. Second, even accepting the flawed
premise that an analysis of legislative history and intent was warranted,
that history only further indicates that Congress intended the explosives
statute to include no relational element. Congress, a body presumed to
know its laws and existing judicial interpretations, chose not to amend
the explosives statute in the same way as it had the firearms statute, even
in light of  longstanding federal court opinions holding that the statute
required no relational element. Moreover, based on the more dangerous
nature of explosives, Congress had good reason to make this policy dis-
222. United States v. Ressam (Ressam II), 491 F.3d 997, 998 (9th Cir. 2007) (denial of rehear-
ing en banc) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
223. Id at 1000 (citing Lamle v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004)).
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tinction. Finally, the Ressam court erred in relying on its own precedent
in the Stewart case. The firearms and explosives statutes are not suffi-
ciently analogous to merit such reliance, and Stewart itself was undercut
by a subsequent Supreme Court case.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit created a temporary split between
circuits, and it set forth an interpretation that would decriminalize several
potential instances of culpable conduct in which an explosive presents a
clear danger. These include several hypothetical cases similar to the
facts of Ressam when explosives are part of a larger scheme but by defi-
nition cannot facilitate the underlying felony. This narrowing of the stat-
ute would undermine Congress's main purpose to deter and severely
punish based on the ever-present danger of explosives by harshly crimi-
nalizing the carrying of an explosive during a federal felony. The Ninth
Circuit's decision greatly affected the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2),
which is a policy decision to be made by Congress and not by the courts.
The Supreme Court's reversal of the Ressam decision resolved a
two-decade debate over the scope of the explosives statute and now, to
the relief of the Justice Department, prosecutors must only demonstrate
that a defendant carried an explosive simultaneously with the commis-
sion of a federal felony. This reading has yielded harsh but just results.
Defendants like Ressam and Rosenberg, whose carrying of their explo-
sives did not facilitate the felony but presented an imminent danger de-
serving of a harsh punishment, were properly convicted of their offenses.
Meanwhile, those who innocently carry explosives and commit a federal
felony under the language of  the state, such as a licensed explosives
transporter who brings personal goods over a land border without declar-
ing them, have remained academic hypotheticals rather than true-life ex-
amples.
The future of the present form of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) lies in the
hands of prosecutors, who must refrain from bringing spurious claims to
court or using the statute as a bargaining tool in instances in which the
conduct of the defendant may meet the letter, but not the spirit, of the
explosives statute. A  prosecution of the hypothetical explosives carrier,
or a similarly situated defendant, could serve as evidence that prosecu-
tors cannot handle the statute's broad reach in a just manner. Such pro-
secutorial abuse might motivate Congress to require a higher burden by
adding a relational element as it did to the firearms statute.
224 As for Ahmed Ressam, the terrorist whose controversial trial and
sentencing yielded a heated debate over statutory construction and the
224. One suggestion, from Justices Kennedy and Stevens at oral arguments, could be that the
Department of  Justice promulgate regulations similar to those with money laundering to prevent
such a prosecution from occurring in the future. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, supra note 143.
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proper role of  the judiciary, his future is far from certain. The lower
courts must now decide how the reinstatement of the explosives charge
should affect his final sentence, if  at all, and make a separate determina-
tion of whether his overall sentence was reasonable. This separate issue
may yet work its way back up to the federal appellate courts. No matter
the result of  Ressam's case, the federal government, which must un-
doubtedly face men like Ahmed Ressam in the future, has retained an
important tool to deter and harshly punish this behavior.
